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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL DIVISION 580 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section 210.1 
of the Civil Service Law. 
#2A-9/l1/75 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0096 
On October 28, 1974, Counsel to the Public Employment Relations 
Board charged the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local Division 580 (Union) with 
violating Civil Service Law Section 210.1 "in that it caused, instigated, 
encouraged, condoned and engaged in a strike against C.N.Y. CENTRO, Inc. on 
October 2 and 3, 1974". In its answer, the Union denied that there had been a 
strike and asserted that its discouragement of bus drivers employed by CENTRO 
from performing overtime work had been provoked by the conduct of CENTRO in 
"refusing to reinstate an employee...to his former employment as a bus driver in 
accordance with the terms of the contract." 
A hearing was held and on April 16, 1975 the hearing officer 
issued her report and recommendations. That report reached a conclusion that 
the Union had struck and that the strike was not occasioned by any acts of 
extreme provocation by CENTRO. Upon the request of the Union, which objected 
to the hearing officer's report and recommendations, we heard oral argument. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the positions of the parties, we 
confirm the findings of fact and conclusions of the hearing officer for the 
reasons stated in her report. We summarize them briefly. 
The Strike 
There is a procedure by which the bus drivers employed by CENTRO 
sign up for regularly scheduled runs. They also sign up for regularly scheduled 
"trippers" at four-month intervals.. These "trippers" constitute overtime work 
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which is not obligatory for the drivers. Nevertheless, CENTRO's operations depend 
upon this work being performed by drivers who undertake it. When CENTRO refused 
to reinstate a bus driver who had suffered a heart attack, the union advised the 
bus drivers, on September 27, to discontinue extra work effective October 2, 
1974. On October 2, 1974 about 51 of 54 drivers who had signed up for "trippers" 
failed to appear for such work. The following day none of the 56 drivers who 
hadsigned up for "trippers" appeared for such work. On both days about half 
the "trippers" were cancelled, with the remaining ones covered by drivers who 
would otherwise have been assigned to charter work. Thus, many charters were 
cancelled on those days. The Union argues that it did not strike because the 
work that its member refused to do was voluntary. The hearing officer properly 
rejected this argument because CENTRO must be able to rely upon the drivers who 
sign up at four-month intervals and because, under these circumstances, a con-
certed refusal to perform even voluntary overtime work is a strike. She found 
that employees who seek the advantages of overtime work must accept the col-
lateral responsibility of performing that xrork as scheduled. 
Extreme Provocation 
Although the bus drivers were upset by conduct that they deemed 
to be a violation of their contract, to wit, the refusal of CENTRO to reinstate 
a driver who had suffered a heart attack, CENTRO considered its action to be 
protected under the contract and justified by the need to prevent accidents. 
CENTRO agreed to arbitrate the contract issue and proposed an expedited arbi-
tration procedure. The hearing officer properly found that the conduct of 
CENTRO did not constitute extreme provocation. 
Impact 
The impact of the strike was relatively slight. It did not affect 
public health or safety, but the public was inconvenienced. Even the public 
t$*J 
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inconvenience caused by the strike was limited by the circumstance that over 90 
percent of the scheduled work was performed notwithstanding the strike against 
overtime work. It should also be noted that the Union believed, albeit mis-
takenly, that its conduct did not constitute a strike. 
We find that the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local Division 580 
violated Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law in that it caused, instigated, 
"encouraged", condoned and7engaged in a strike as" charged. ~ ~" 
WE ORDER that the dues deduction privileges of Amalgamated Transit 
Union, Local Division 580 be suspended for a period of 
three months and that, if the employer does not normally 
deduct dues in equal monthly installments, it should not 
deduct more than three-quarters of the annual dues during 
the twelve-month period commencing this date; provided, 
however, that until Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 
Division 580 affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government, no dues shall be deduc-
ted on their behalf by CENTRO. 
Dated: New York, New York 
September 11, 1975 





red L. Denson 
8947 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Employer, 
and 
NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
STATE, COUNTY AND MUN IC IPAL EMPLOYEES, AF;L-CI0 , 
Petitioner, 
and 
TOWN OF RAMAPO UNIT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
# 2 B - 9 / l 1 / 7 5 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER. 
CASE-NQ-.--O407-2-
This matter comes to us on exceptions of the Town of Ramapo Unit 
of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA), intervenor herein, 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
finding appropriate a unit sought by N.Y. Council 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), 
the petitioner herein. in its response, AFSCME urges us to reject CSEA's 
exceptions on technical grounds. Further, arguing that the Director's 
determination granting its petition is correct, it nevertheless asserts that 
he erred in one significant finding which, if reversed, would render even more 
compelling the justification for the unit that it sought. In the case before 
the Director, the Town of Ramapo (Town), along with CSEA, opposed fragmentation 
of the existing unit. AFSCME indicated that if a separate unit of Highway 
Department employees was not appropriate, its alternative position would be 
that a separate blue collar unit would be appropriate, but it wished to 
participate in any election for a unit found to be appropriate. 
Having reviewed the record, heard the parties' arguments, and read 
their briefs, we reject the unit sought and continue the existing'unit. 
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Background 
For several years, CSEA has been the representative of a unit of 
about 142 blue and white collar employees of the Town of Ramapo, and in that 
capacity it has negotiated successive collective agreements with the Town, its 
most recent agreement being for 1973-74, Of the approximately 82 blue collar 
employees in the unit, 47 are in the Highway Department (which has _np_.white 
collar employees), with the rest in the Department of Public Works or Parks 
and Recreation. AFSCME petitioned for the decertification of CSEA in the 
overall unit and for its own certification in a unit of Highway Department 
employees. At the hearing, AFSCME amended its petition to specify that the 
employees it is seeking to represent are employed by the Town Superintendent of 
Highways (Superintendent) rather than by the Town itself. Much of the 
evidence and argument went to the question of whether either the Town or the 
Superintendent was the sole employer of the Highway Department employees or 
whether they were a joint employer. In his decision the Director wrote: "If 
the Superintendent is a sole or a joint employer of the highway department 
employees, these employees would perforce belong in a separate negotiating unit.!! 
Finding that the Town and the Superintendent jointly employed the Highway 
Department employees, he determined that the case for a separate unit for 
Highway Department employees was compelling, and he directed an election in 
that unit. 
CSEA's exceptions assert that the Town is the sole employer of the 
Highway Department employees and that such employees share a community of interest 
*\/ith the other Town employees in the overall unit. AFSCME argues that the 
exceptions are technically defective by reason of their failure to comply with 
the requirements of §201.12(b) of our Rules which require that exceptions desig-
nate by page citations the portions of the record relied upon. Over the objections 
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of AFSCME, we rejected this argument but we required CSEA to file supplemental 
exceptions providing the required information. AFSCME was then permitted to 
file a supplemental response to exceptions and a supplemental brief in support 
thereof and it availed itself of this opportunity. The other AFSCME responses 
to the exceptions assert that Highway Department employees have a community of 
interest among themselves, which interest is in conflict with the interests of 
employees of other departments of the Town. The implication of these 
assertions is that a separate unit of Highway Department employees is required 
regardless of who their employer is. Although willing to accept the Director's 
conclusion of a joint employer, it states in its brief: "In view of the 
independence and statutory responsibilities of the Superintendent of Highways, 
AFSCME submits that he is the sole employer of Highway employees." 
Discussion 
Were we persuaded by the Director's analysis that the Superintendent 
and the Town were joint employers, or by AFSCME1s analysis that the Superin-
tendent is a sole employer of Highway Department employees, we would have to 
consider the appropriateness of a multi-employer unit in the light of the 
negotiating unit standards in CSL §207. But concluding as we do that the Town 
is a sole employer, we do not reach that question. 
The circumstances that persuaded the Director that the Superintendent 
was a separate government who could be and was a joint employer are the statutor 
nature of his responsibilities— and the extent of his control over the working 
conditions of Highway Department employees. It is not unusual for public 
2/ The Director wrote "It has long been recognized that the maintenance of 
highways and bridges is a governmental function [footnote omitted], and 
this duty devolves upon the elected Superintendent by statute." 
Board decision - C-1072 - k -
officers of State and municipal governments to have responsibilities assigned 
2/ by statute.— Most of the incidents of control over Highway Department 
employees that the Director finds are exercised by the Superintendent are 
exercised by persons who are "appointing officers" within the meaning of 
that term under the Civil Service Law. Such persons are not usually 
independent public employers. It would be significant if the Superintendent 
enjoyed the right, as concluded by the Director, to veto parts of an 
agreement negotiated by the Town that are related to non-fiscal terms and 
conditions of employment of Highway Department employees. The record, however, 
does not establish that this is the case. All that has been established is that 
the Town negotiators were -deferential to the judgment of the Superintendent 
with respect to matters coming up in negotiations that involved his Department. 
What remains to distinguish the Superintendent from other department heads 
of the Town is that he alone is elected. We do not find that this circumstance 
is sufficient to constitute him as a separate public employer or government 
within the meaning of the Taylor Law. In this regard, we find little 
difference between a town superintendent of highways who is elected and county 
superintendents of highways who under County Law §^00.4 (a) are appointed. 
3/ County superintendents of highways also have their duties specified by statute— 
kl 
and under local law many are "appointing officers".— 
_' e.g. See Labor Law §21 which specifies responsibilities of the State 
Industrial Commissioner and County Law §725 and Highway Law §102 which 
specify the responsibilities of the County Superintendents of Highways. 
1/ County Law §725 and Highway Law §102. 
—' e.g. See Orleans County Local Law No. 2 of 1972, Otsego County Local Law 
No. 1 of 1962, Schuyler County Local Law No. 1 of 1951 and Orange County 
Local Law No. 1 of 195^. Also see Seely v. Kaplan, Ik Misc. 2d 381 
(Albany County, 1960) re the Orange County Superintendent of Highways. 
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The Director relied upon our decision in Matter of Ulster County 
(3 PERB 4205, Aff'd County of Ulster v. CSEA, 37 App.Div. 2d 437 [3rd Dept. 
1971])for the conclusion that the Superintendent and the Town constituted a 
joint employer. That decision, in which we held a county and a sheriff were 
a joint employer, is inapposite. A sheriff exercises unique authority over 
deputy sheriffs— that are not duplicated by the heads of other departments of 
state or municipal governments. 
Concluding as we do that the Town is the sole employer of persons 
employed by the Highway Department, we must resolve the question of whether 
those employees share a community of interest with other Town employees. 
6/ On the evidence in the record we determine that they do.— We also determine 
that there is no conflict between their interest and those of other Town 
employees.— Thus we find no basis for isolating Highway Department employees 
from other blue collar employees of the Town. We also reject a separation of 
blue and white collar employees into different units in this case. Ordinarily 
we do establish separate units for blue and white collar employees of a single 
employer because of a presumption that the two groups of employees cannot 
negotiate effectively in a single unit. Where, however, as in this case, there 
is a long-standing history of negotiations in a single unit, which history 
5/ See Matter of Flaherty v. Milliken, 193 N.Y. 564 (1908); Matter of O'Brien v 
Ordway, 218 N.Y. 509 (1916); Matter of Delorio v. County of Suffolk, 48 
Misc. 2d 584 (1965). See also Boardman v. Holliday, 10 Paige 223 (1843); 
Edmunds v. Barton, 31 N.Y. 495 (1865)-
6/ Although we do not here recite all the evidence on which we base this con-
clusion, we do give special emphasis to the occasional interchange of per-
sonnel and equipment between the Highway Department, the Sewer Division 
and the Department of Parks and Recreation. 
7/ There is evidence that the negotiating representative was not successful in 
obtaining for Town Highway Department employees the demanded double-time 
which they sought, but indications are that the compromise settlement 
resulted from the normal give and take of collective bargaining in the course 
of which other Highway Department employees' demands were achieved, and not 
from a conflict of interest. ^^>~ 
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indicates that negotiations have been meaningful and effective, we do continue 
overall units (Matter of Town of Smithtown, 8 PERB 3016). 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Director, and we determine 
the unit which consists of employees of the Town as follows: 
Included: All employees of the Town of Ramapos 
Excluded: 1. Members of the Town of Ramapo Police Department. 
2. All employees in the uncTassifred service. 
3. All employees in the exempt class of the classified 
service. 
k. Elected officials. 
5. The officer or head of each department, office, or 
agency who has the power to appoint, pursuant to 
law, any employee appointed as a Deputy to such officer 
or head of department, office or agency and is paid as 
such, chief executive or director of each department, 
office or agency under the jurisdiction of a Board or 
Commission, the Chief Clerk of the Justice Court, all 
Town Attorneys, the Confidential Clerk to the Supervisor 
and the Publicity Director of the Town of Ramapo. 
IT IS ORDERED that an election by secret ballot shall be held under 
the supervision of the Director among employees of the Town in the negotiating 
unit set forth above who were on the payroll immediately preceding this 
decision; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Town shall submit to the Director, 
as well as to AFSCME and CSEA, within seven days from the date of receipt of 
this decision, an alphabetical listing of the employees in the negotiating 
unit set forth above who are employees on the payroll date immediately preceding 
the date of this decision. _.-<—,. 
Dated: New York, New York . / " 1/^~~~1 A-^yl 
September 11, 1975 S •& J7f //^'/YY/ 
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Dissent of Board Member Fred L. Denson 
I do not agree with either the rationale or result reached by the 
majority in reversing the decision of the Director. 
In his decision, the Director has adequately enumerated several 
reasons why the Superintendent of Highways is a joint employer with the Town. 
As an elected official, the Superintendent has been granted certain "governmental. 
-powers " as .delineated, in Sect ion^ 140_ of _ the ^Highway Law, leaving .little._ doub t_. 
that he is an employer within the meaning of CSL Section 201.6(a). I am unable 
to find a significant distinction between the present matter and our Ulster 
County decision that a Sheriff is a joint employer with a County. The Sheriff 
and the Superintendent of Highways are similar for Taylor Law purposes. Both 
are elected officials, both are liable for acts of negligence by their sub-
ordinates, both are responsible for the hire, discharge and supervision of 
employees and both are fiscally dependent upon a legislative body for appro-
priations. Granted, the duties of their offices are vastly different, but this 
has no impact upon whether or not they are joint employers. Thus, for reasons 
mentioned by the Director and for reasons of consistency with prior decisions 
by this Board and the Courts, it is my opinion that the Superintendent is a 
joint employer for Taylor Law purposes. 
Whether or not the Town has afforded him the right to veto portions of 
a negotiated agreement involving his employees is not germain in this determin-
ation even though the majority has stressed this' . factor in support of its 
finding. The Superintendent of Highways is accountable to the electorate for 
his actions and is dependent upon the Town for appropriations only. The Town 
Board can neither bestow nor take away from him the power to veto parts of an 
agreement with employees in his department since:./ absent any statutory restric-
tion in this regard, he inherently has this right by virtue of being an elected 
official. The fact that he may not have exercised his veto power does not mean 
that he does not have it. Much to the contrary, an appointed official has only 
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as much power as the appointing agency has granted; obviously, the appointing 
agency may x<rithhold or grant veto powers to its appointees with regard to 
contract negotiations. 
Although not discussed in the majority opinion, one factor of concern 
to the entire Board is the potential effect on existing units in other towns 
which include highway department employees, of a determination that the 
Superintendent of Highways is a joint employer. Each town having employees 
working for a Superintendent of Highways would be entitled to separate unit 
status, thus greatly increasing the potential number of bargaining units under 
the jurisdiction of this Board. Be that as it may, unless and until the defi-
nition of public employer as set forth in Section 201.6(a) of the Civil Service 
Law is changed by legislation to exclude Superintendents of Highways as public 
employers, a unit determination should not be made which is contrary to existing 
statutory as well as case law on the subject. 
Not only do I disagree with the majority's finding that the Superintendent 
of Highways is not a joint employer, but assuming arguendo that I were to accept 
that position, I would still dissent from their decision. I disagree with their 
refusal to grant separate unit status to blue collar employees. As set forth in 
my dissenting opinion in Smith town, 8 PERB 3016, 2017, as well as in several 
prior Board and Director decisions (Islip, 3 PERB 4213; Babylon, 3 PERB 4235; 
Sullivan County, 7 PERB 3117), the interests of blue collar workers and white 
collar workers are inherently different and they should not be placed in the 
same unit unless there are other special circumstances to dictate such. 
I would sustain the decision of the Director. 
Dated: New York, New York 
September 11, 1975 
Fred L. Denson 
385o 
